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Abstract 
Tracing a route through the recent ‗ugly history‘ of British citizenship, this article advances 
two central claims: Firstly, British citizenship has been designed to fail specific groups and 
populations. Failure, it argues, is a design principle of British citizenship, in the most active 
and violent sense of the verb to design: to mark out, to indicate, to designate. Secondly, 
British citizenship is a biopolitics - a field of techniques and practices (legal, social, moral) 
through which populations are controlled and fashioned. This article begins with the 1981 
Nationality Act and the violent conflicts between the police and black communities in Brixton 
which accompanied the passage of the Act through the British parliament. Employing Michel 
Foucault‘s concept of state racism, it argues that the 1981 Nationality Act marked a pivotal 
moment in the design of British citizenship and has operated as the template for a glut of 
subsequent nationality legislation which has shaped who can achieve citizenship. The 
central argument is that the existence of populations of failed citizens within Britain is not an 
accident of flawed design, but is foundational to British citizenship. For many `national 
minorities` the lived realities of biopolitical citizenship stand in stark contradistinction to 
contemporary governmental accounts of citizenship which stress community cohesion, 
political participation, social responsibility, rights and pride in shared national belonging.  
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Children and young people born in the UK who have lived here all their life may be 
shocked to discover ... that they are not citizens of the country where they have 
always lived.  
Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association 2007 
 
Cynthia Weber argues that ‗modern liberal citizenship is a failing design‘ (2008, p. 125).  
Weber‘s argument draws on design guru Bruce Mau‘s statement that ‗For most of us, design 
is invisible. Until it fails‘ (2004, p. 1). If, for Mau, successful design becomes naturalised so 
that it no longer visibly intrudes upon its environment, then, for Weber, ‗the sheer volume of 
ideas, images, and events‘ in circulation about citizenship regarding ‗who has it but shouldn‘t 
have it, who should have it but doesn‘t have it, [and] who had it but renounced it‘ is evidence 
of a failure of citizenship design (2008, p. 125).1 Mau‘s statement tellingly begins with the 
phrase, ‗for most of us‘, and it is those whom citizenship fails that this article will focus on. 
Tracing a route through the recent ‗ugly history‘ (ILPA, 2007, p.7) of British citizenship, this 
article advances two central claims: Firstly, British citizenship has been designed to fail 
specific groups and populations. Failure, it argues, is a design principle of British citizenship, 
in the most active and violent sense of the verb to design: to mark out, to indicate, to 
designate. Secondly, British citizenship is a biopolitics - a field of biopolitical2 techniques and 
practices (legal, social, moral) through which populations are controlled and fashioned.  
 
This article begins with the 1981 Nationality Act and the violent conflicts between the police 
and black communities in Brixton which accompanied the passage of the Act through the 
British parliament.3 Employing Michel Foucault‘s concept of state racism (2003), it argues 
that the 1981 Nationality Act marked a pivotal moment in the design of British citizenship and 
has operated as the template for a glut of subsequent nationality legislation which has 
shaped who can achieve citizenship Some of the consequences of the abolition of birth right 
citizenship (Jus soli) in the 1981 Act and the subsequent institution of harsh immigration and 
asylum laws and systems are explored through an account of the experiences of a failed 
asylum-seeker, Sonia, and her children, drawn from interview data and the campaign 
materials of anti-deportation activists. The central argument is that the existence of 
populations of failed citizens within Britain is not an accident of flawed design, but is 
foundational to British citizenship. For many `national minorities`4 the lived realities of 
biopolitical citizenship stand in stark contradistinction to contemporary governmental 
accounts of citizenship which stress community cohesion, political participation, social 
responsibility, rights and pride in shared national belonging. Indeed, the (counter) argument 
3 
 
that I develop in this article, is that from the 1980s onwards British citizenship has become a 
mechanism through which democratic freedoms are retracted from individuals and 
communities, as wealth and power is concentrated in the hands of the social and political 
elites. 
 
State Racism   
Although a vast theoretical literature on citizenship has been imported into Britain, 
citizenship is an oddly undeveloped concept within British society and culture.5 The first 
substantive accounts of British citizenship emerged in the 1950s, inspired by economist 
John Maynard Keynes (1936), social reformer William Beveridge (1942) and sociologist T.H 
Marshall (1950).6 If British citizenship has its roots in the liberal welfarism that predominated 
after the Second World War, by the early 1980s citizenship had become dislocated from any 
redistributive ideals, the Marshallian constellation of welfare state, social rights and class 
equality was replaced with nationality, immigration and security. The 1981 Nationality Act 
was not concerned with the constitutional rights of citizens, nor with mapping out the 
relationship between citizen and state; it was an Immigration Act designed to define, limit 
and remove the entitlements to citizenship from British nationals in the Commonwealth (the 
former colonies) thereby restricting immigration to the British Isles and creating ‗aliens‘ within 
the borders of the nation state. This Act instituted a ‗citizenship gap‘ within the British state, 
and between the state and former British colonies, as large numbers of British nationals 
found they had been designed out of citizenship (see Alison Brysk and Gershon Shafir 
2004).  Political geographer Brad Blitz argues that ‗the revocation of the rights to citizenship 
and residency‘ often take place ‗during periods of state building‘. The 1981 Act was passed 
by the conservative Thatcher government (1979--1990) during a period of intense 
institutional reorganization that was to transform Britain into a neoliberal nation-state, a 
transformation as significant as the social and infrastructural reforms that took place during 
the 1950s post-War period (2006, p. 453). 
 
The 1981 Nationality Act created several categories of nationality and citizenship, including a 
category of ‗Commonwealth citizenship‘, which removed from British nationals in the 
Commonwealth and Hong Kong their historic rights to residency in the United Kingdom. As 
The Sunday Times reported in 1981, the act ‗for the first time seeks to define British 
Citizenship and those who ―belong to Britain‖ [and] to abolish the historic right of common 
British Citizenship enjoyed by the colonial peoples‘ (in Baucom, 1999, p. 195). Whilst race 
and ethnicity were never directly named, the 1981 Act effectively designed citizenship so as 
to exclude black and Asian populations in the Commonwealth while leaving ‗routes home‘ for 
4 
 
white nationals born within the boundaries of the empire. As postcolonial theorist Ian 
Baucom notes, ‗to be British, [the Act] mandated, one had to trace a line of descent to an 
ancestor born on the island. In effect, the law thus drew the lines of the nation [...] around the 
boundaries of race‘ (1999, p. 195). The passage of this Act through parliament was thus a 
significant event in the history of British race relations, a moment when, through citizenship, 
racism was implicitly incorporated within the judicial body of the State becoming an active 
component part of its operational system of ‗legal justice‘. Indeed, critical lawyer David Dixon 
described the Act as ‗constitutionalising racism‘ (Dixon 1981).  
 
The Nationality Act provoked public debate about the meaning of Britishness and the 
relationship between the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth. While the Act was being 
passed in parliament, riots broke out in Brixton, a borough of London with a significant black 
population.7 The Brixton riots marked the beginning of a significant period of civil unrest 
sparking three months of intensive rioting between Black and Asian communities and police 
across England. In Brixton, public anger was directed towards the Metropolitan police force, 
and the uprising was triggered by a police operation called Operation Swamp 81. The 
operation‘s name was widely interpreted as a reference to a notorious comment by Margaret 
Thatcher in a 1978 television interview in which she implied that a white native population 
feared being swamped by ‗people of a different culture‘. Operation Swamp 81 was 
purportedly part of a city-wide operation to reduce street crime in London. In actuality it 
focused on Brixton, employing ancient vagrancy legislation, the infamous ‗sus‘ laws.8 In the 
first six days of the operation, 120 plain-clothes officers stopped and searched 943 people in 
Brixton, arresting 118 predominantly black male youths.9   
 
Lord Scarman‘s influential report into the causes of the Brixton riots, The Scarman Report: 
The Brixton Disorders 10-12 April 1981 (1982), argued that the black population in Brixton 
had been subject to ‗disproportionate and indiscriminate‘ policing. The ‗sus laws‘ were 
abolished on the recommendation of his report. Scarman also acknowledged that social 
deprivation and racial prejudice had contributed to the riots but refused to accept claims of 
institutional racism within the police or indeed other parts of the state. The report argued that 
institutional racism referred to a society ‗which knowingly and as a matter of policy 
discriminated against Black people‘ and denied that this was the case in Britain (Scarman 
1982, p.28). However, others have insisted that the Brixton riots should be read as a 
response to the 1981 Nationality Act. The creation of a ‗second-class‘ commonwealth 
citizenship and news coverage of the Act created palpable anxiety and growing rage within 
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black communities across Britain. These communities perceived that a new form of imperial 
racism was driving the citizenship agenda. As an anonymous commentary in the journal 
Race and Class argued in 1981, the Nationality Act transformed immigration law into an 
instrument of domestic social control and formed ‗the administrative basis for what is 
tantamount to a pass law society. [This Act has] brought immigration law within doors‘ (1981, 
p. 242).  
 
This Act illustrates what Foucault termed ‗state racism‘: a means of classifying, 
distinguishing and opposing a population on the basis of appeals to essentialist categories of 
origin. For Foucault racism always disguises, or is an alibi for, an historical class struggle. In 
the context of Britain a post-imperial class struggle over the resources of a diminished 
Empire was underway. The 1981 Act, produced `ethnic hierarchies` in Britain which, 
combined with the existing class divisions, led to civil unrest. This in turn enabled minorities 
to be constituted `as a threat to the social body‘ and targeted through policing and reform 
(see Nelson, 2008, p.33). The claim that the Act was ushering in a new period of ‗home rule‘ 
through state racism was central to Salman Rushdie‘s polemical 1982 essay ‗The New 
Empire within Britain‘. Rushdie argued that as the British Empire contracted, the borders of 
the Empire were being reproduced at home through newly legitimized practices of state 
racism, which in turn explained hostility towards the police as agents of state power. As 
Rushdie wrote, ‗For the citizens of the new, imported Empire, for the colonized Asians and 
blacks of Britain, the police force represents that colonizing army, those regiments of 
occupation and control‘ (1982).  
 
The 1981 Nationality Act and the nostalgia for a British homeland expressed within it, 
exposes a fear amongst the ruling elites that Britain was losing its sense of national identity 
as it lost its hold on the Empire. Right wing MP Enoch Powell, who was in many ways the 
real author of this act, declared on hearing that it had passed through Parliament: ‗from the 
humiliation of having no nation to which we distinctively belong, the people of the United 
Kingdom are now setting themselves free‘. The Nationality Act, Powell stated, marked ‗the 
end of our brief imperial episode ... and the laying of that ghost, the Common-wealth‘ (in 
Dixon, 1983, p. 175).  The link between post-imperial national identity, democratic freedom 
and immigration control, has become cemented into a form of common sense in Britain and 
drives the New Labour citizenship agenda. As Prime Minster Gordon Brown stated in a 2008 




there is a real danger that while other countries gain from having a clear definition of 
their destiny in a fast changing global economy, we may lose out if we prove slow to 
express and live up to the British values that can move us to act together. ... being 
more explicit about what it means to be a British citizen we can not only manage 
immigration in a way that is good for Britain - for our citizens, our way of life, our 
society, and our economy but at the same time move forward as a more confident 
Britain (Brown 2008). 
 
State racism is legitimized predominantly through the need for security and the idea that 
non-citizens threaten to overwhelm the diminishing resources of the Welfare state and are 
stealing the resources which rightfully belong to citizens. Perversely, appeals to Marshallian 
rights-based notions of citizenship, rooted in welfare and distributive justice, are thus used to 
legitimize the abjection of ‗illegal‘ populations from the protections of citizenship and the 
enforcement of brutal and inhumane immigration controls.  
Home front 
 
In the last decade, ‗security‘ has emerged as a central preoccupation of European and North 
American governments. Increasingly, the idea of security is framed less in relation to 
external threats than in terms of securing the state from the hidden threats of `dangerous 
classes` within the ‗nation home‘. In the US this is perhaps best encapsulated by the 
establishment of the office of Homeland Security in 2001, a title that echoes the now defunct 
British Government office, the Ministry of Home Security established during the Second 
World War to manage national civil defence in anticipation of foreign invasion. In this 
context, the nation is implicitly or explicitly redesignated as the ‗home front‘, a battle line 
behind which the civilian populace is mobilized as a supporting arm of the military. It implies 
the imperative of effective militarization of a society during wartime. This redesignation 
legitimizes the militarization of everyday life and presumes a popular consensus in favour of 
forgoing democratic freedoms in the face of external and internal threats to security.  
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri describe the shift from ‗defence‘ to ‗security‘ as a 
movement from ‗a reactive and conservative‘ to an ‗active and constructive‘ mode of 
government (2005, p.20). For Hardt and Negri this shift is framed by a simultaneous 
movement to a ‗perpetual state of war‘ in which war is an active and indeed integral 
component of state governance, ‗justifying constant martial activity in the homeland and 
abroad‘ (2005, p.21). Britain, understood as ‗a nation at war‘, is thus able to implement 
endless ‗security measures‘ including the use of ‗terror laws‘ to suspend indefinitely the 
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liberties and rights promised by citizenship. Changes to the Terrorism Act in 2006 
criminalised ‗anti-governmental‘ activities in ways unprecedented since the Second World 
War. There have also been calls for Britain to develop its own homeland security office, a 
development which many predict will be a key recommendation of the Government‘s 
Commission on National Security in the 21st Century. The first publication to result from this 
commission, entitled ‗The New Front Line: Security in a changing world‘, states that, ‗old 
notions of the security front line no longer work and that some frontlines now exist overseas 
in places like Afghanistan, while some also exist at the local community level here at home 
(Kearns and Gude, 2008, p.7 ). 
There is nothing new here, of course. We have been aware for some time that the front line 
is here, at home, this is precisely what Rushdie argues when he states that the frontline of 
the Empire was brought home by the 1981 Nationality Act. William Walters terms this 
reconfiguration of the relations between citizen, state and territory ‗domopolitics‘: ‗a fateful 
conjunction of home, land and security‘ which ‗rationalizes a series of security measures in 
the name of a particular conception of home‘ (2004, p. 241). As he writes: 
[Homeland] has powerful affinities with family, intimacy, place: the home as hearth, 
a refuge or a sanctuary in a heartless world; the home as our place, where we 
belong naturally, and where, by definition, others do not; international order as a 
space of home…Domopolitics embodies a tactic which juxtaposes the ‗warm words‘ 
of community, trust, and citizenship, with the danger words of a chaotic outside - 
illegals, traffickers, terrorists; a game which configures things as ‗Us vs. Them‘ 
(2004, p. 241). 
‗Domopolitics‘ is a performative politics which employs the rhetoric of home as a means of 
sanctioning exceptional measures, including the violent abjection of non-citizens. As Walters 
suggests, citizenship, a legal sign of belonging to the nation-home, is integral to this 
refiguration of the nation and, indeed, of the international order as a space of homes. 
Furthermore, domopolitics is perfomative because the mechanisms though which the 
militarisation of everyday life is ushered in, are not clandestine but take place in full view with 
public sanction: from the police brutality in Brixton to the current deportation of hundreds of 
thousands of non-citizens. British citizens demand it. As Foucault has extensively argued, 
every citizen is sovereign in the context of the bio-political state, just as every German 
citizen was responsible for spying on and exposing their Jewish neighbours, so in 
contemporary Britain, all citizens are expected to report on those cheating the system—this 
extends from those seen to be exploiting social security or national health care, to those 
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without passports. As Didier Bigo (1994) suggests, the militarisation of the nation is figured 
as part of a necessary ‗security continuum‘ that ‗stretches from terrorism to regulation of 
asylum rights, including drugs, action against crime, clandestine immigration, and migratory 
flows‘ (Bigo cited Walters, 2004, p. 240). Citizenship plays a central role within this 
securitised State, enabling specific groups and populations to be legitimately targeted and 
criminalised as non-citizens, or failing citizens. Central to this home rule is a ‗transfer of 
illegitimacy‘ in which previously ‗protected‘ populations, such as regular migrants and asylum 
seekers, and their British-born children, find themselves subjected to diverse bio-political and 
carceral technologies (Bigo cited Walters, 2004, p. 240).   
I have argued that from the perspective of the 1981 Act the proliferation of categories of 
people variously marginalised by or excluded from citizenship (and the rights which flow from 
this status) is not an unintentional ‗design flaw‘ but is an integral component of British 
citizenship design. If British citizenship has been designed to fail, it has been thus designed 
in order to govern populations within the state by producing some subjects as successful 
citizens and others as variously precarious or failed. These failed citizens, who have been 
legally abjected from the state are nevertheless often contained and sometimes detained 
‗within the state as its interiorised other‘ (Butler 2007, p. 17). These populations of the failed 
are in the strange position of being outside the legal protections of citizenship, but 
nevertheless subject to the full force of state power. As Judith Butler describes it, they are 
‗both expelled and contained...saturated with power at the moment in which [they are] 
deprived of citizenship‘ (2007, p. 40). In the next part of this article, I will introduce the story 





In 2006 a heavily pregnant West African teenager, ‗Sonia‘, was apprehended trying to leave 
Britain with a false passport. Despite her young age and her condition, the Crown Court 
deemed it appropriate, employing new legislative guidance, to punish this offence with a six-
month jail sentence in an adult prison. The court also recommended that Sonia be deported 
immediately after serving her sentence. For a decade now, Britain has been engaged in a 
significant deportation programme.  According to the British Government 63,140 non-citizens 
were deported in 2008, ‗one person every eight minutes‘ (Byrne2007). The brutal treatment 
of unwanted migrants at the borders of European states and at the land and coastal borders 
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of the European Union became routinised during the 1980s and 1990s. Within the 
securitised imaginary that currently dominates in Britain, the mass imprisonment and 
deportation of failed asylum seekers and other suspect foreigners, is widely perceived as the 
only logical solution to the imagined threats of immigration (Tyler 2006). Sonia‘s case is thus 
not exceptional, but it nevertheless enables us to focus on some of the micro-practices 
which are a consequence of the constellation of citizenship, borders and failure that I have 
been describing.  One of few notable things about Sonia‘s case is that it was reported, albeit 
very briefly and factually, in a national newspaper. In one sense, this news story simply 
reinforces the perception that Britain is ‗tough on illegals‘. From another perspective it is 
extraordinary, for Sonia‗s ‗crime‘ involved an attempt to leave Britain, a country in which she 
was deemed to be illegally residing.  
When I interviewed Sonia, she explained that when she was arrested at the border she had 
been desperate to escape Britain. She had been evicted from her temporary accommodation 
and was destitute, and she feared for what would become of her and her unborn child on the 
streets of Britain, or if she was deported to her country of origin. So she had planned to 
travel to another African state where she had some friends and contacts. Now a convicted 
criminal, Sonia‘s ability to make a fresh claim of asylum had been severely compromised, 
and she has failed all her possible appeals.  
Asylum-seekers convicted of crimes, however minor, rescind their rights to political asylum in 
Britain. For the purposes of this article, the legitimacy of Sonia‘s claim for refugee protection 
under interntional law is less significant than her disproportionate treatment by the British 
State. A teenage girl, heavily pregnant in a foreign country, she was imprisoned for six 
months and detained for over a year for using a fake passport. Sonia is totally traumatized 
and deeply ashamed at being treated ‗like a criminal...I just really...really...I didn‘t think it was 
true...I just couldn‘t believe it ... I worried very much [about] what would people [at home] 
think of me if they found out‘. Sonia served the full six-month custodial sentence at Holloway 
Prison, where she gave birth to her daughter, ‗Mary‘. She recalled being taken in handcuffs 
to ante-natal appointments and had to endure the presence of prison officers throughout her 
labour and childbirth.  
After serving her prison sentence, Sonia and Mary were transferred directly to Yarl‘s Wood 
Immigration Detention Centre, the largest immigrant prison for women and children in 
Europe, to await their deportation to West Africa. The detention of people subject to 
migration control in Britain was first codified under the 1920 Aliens Act and elaborated in the 
1971 Immigration Act. Britain now has more wide-ranging powers than any other European 
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nation to imprison foreign nationals, however, prior to 1988 non-citizens were rarely 
detained, or indeed deported. There were on average between 200 and 300 people in 
detention at any given time. By 2003, that had ‗escalated to over 2260 people detained, 
including children and pregnant women‘ (Welch and Schuster 2005, p. 402). Mary, who had 
been imprisoned since her birth, was, like most children in detention, failing to thrive in 
conditions which the British Government‘s own prison inspectors have repeatedly called 
totally inappropriate for pregnant women, nursing mothers and children. Sonia‗s homeless 
and destitute husband ‗Jonah‘ was stopped from visiting his wife and daughter in detention. 
Sonia‘s body shakes as she recounts to me what she happened to Jonah, ‗he was shouting 
and screaming at them [the guards] ... they just said we can‘t tell you if she is here or not 
because you don‗t have a [visting] pass...they [the guards] told me later that he went crazy 
right there... ripping at his clothes....crying...finally they brought a doctor [and] took him 
away‘. Jonah was later sectioned under the Mental Health Act (1983). As far as Sonia is 
concerned he had literally been driven to insanity by the British state. Whilst she was in 
Yarl‘s Wood, Sonia took part in a hunger strike with other mothers to protest at the detention 
of their babies and children. Months later, with the support of anti-deportation activists, Sonia 
managed to obtain a lawyer and, with the help of a friend, was eventually granted bail out of 
detention. Mary had spent the first six-months of her life in prison. 
 
When I interviewed Sonia in 2009, she was living in social housing in a city in the North of 
England with Mary, now a toddler, and a new baby, ‗Sam‗. She tells me Jonah doesn‘t live 
with her and his children but that he visits them. She suggests, indirectly, that he is 
struggling with mental health problems. Like all failed asylum seekers, Sonia cannot work. 
She has absolutely minimal benefits, significantly below those deemed necessary to support 
a dignified life for British citizens, and she has no legal access to health or social care. She 
is dependent on charity for basics such as clothing and furniture and receives social housing 
because she has children, (otherwise as a failed asylum seeker she would be made 
forceably homeless).  My field notes read. There is little very furniture, or stuff in the house, 
apart from a television, which playing an African movie very loudly, and a sofa. Everything is 
clean but I am shocked by the condition of the children, Mary seems tiny for her age and 
they are both covered in ezcema and rashes,  and they are dressed in dirty clothes. Sonia is 
also dishevelled, it occurs to me that she is frightened of me. Outside in the garden I see a 
washing line with all the families clean clothes blowing dry in the wind. I feel ashamed that I 
am passing judgement on her, as though I could possibly know what it means to be living 




Sonia and her children are surviving in conditions of crushing poverty and deprivation. When 
I ask her how she managed to survive, she reassures me that things `aren‗t that bad now‗ 
and describes as a counterpoint a period immediately after she had been bailed from 
immigration detention but before she was in reciept of any state benefits. `I  was so hungry, I 
thought I was going  to die - the terrible pains in my stomach‗, she grasps herself as she 
talks. Sonia has exhausted all her legal appeals for leave to remain in Britain, and remains 
under ‗bail conditions‗ - subject to detention and deportation at any time. Sonia detailed her 
daily routines, explaining how she has to register at the local immigrant office each week, 
(ironically, this is in case she absconds). She explains that ‗this is much better than before 
because when they first moved me here I had to register everyday and it was a long way 
from my house, two buses‗.  Many failed asylum seekers are taken into detention when they 
register, and Sonia describes how she always leaves her children with a friend whilst she 
attends at the imigration centre, as she thinks that the border and immigration officials will be 
less likely to detain her without them. Registering with the immigration and border control 
can take hours if it is busy. Throughout my interview with her, Sonia is extremely agitated 
and wary.  She is literally on the edge of her seat.  She relaxes only at the end of the 
interview when I turn off the recorder. I represent the state who has treated her `worse than 
a dog‗, or perhaps one of `those activists` who she worries will draw attention to her, whilst 
what she wants is to become invisible: ‗The longer nobody comes [to deport her and the 
children], I keep thinking, it is possible they have forgotten about me, and that I can stay and 
have [a] normal life then the door knocks...I think, ―No!―...because I cannot describe it [the 
prison and the detention centre]...I cannot go back...anything is better than that‗. 
 
Sociologist Saskia Sassen argues that the criminalisation of migration is slowly poisoning 
European civic societies. In particular she suggests that the growing numbers of 
(predominantly African) migrant deaths at European borders ‗represent a failing policy, but 
also a gradual corrosion of the sense of citizenship, responsibility, and ultimately humanity 
itself‘ (2008). Sassen‘s intervention is important, but the risk of this ‗moral bankruptcy‘ 
argument is that it fails to acknowledge the increasingly central role of citizenship in 
establishing border controls. As I have argued, the 1981 Act instituted a mass classification 
of types of citizens that was designed to exclude specific post-colonial populations and 
manage ‗migrant‘ populations within the nation-home. The abjection of migrants like Sonia 
and her British-born children, who came to Britain from a former European colony, is an 
effect of the racist design of British citizenship, the abolition of birthright citizenship and 
removal of residency rights from former colonised peoples.   
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Sonia‘s story also reveals how borders are highly gendered practices. As Martha Escobar 
argues, `Ideal migrant labor is frequently defined as sojourner and exploitable, meaning that 
they migrate, labor for a while, and return to their home countries. The presence of migrant 
women disrupts this ideal since they represent reproduction and settlement (2008). 
Immigration controls often focus on the reproductive bodies of women, for example home 
office guidelines stipulate that pregnant women should be routinely questioned by 
immigration officials as suspected `heath tourists‘. However, if unwanted migrant mothers 
are soft targets for immigration controls, they are also sites of migrant resistance. For whilst 
their status as mothers often constitutes their vulnerability and otherness - as maternal 
figures who represent `life itself‗ they carry moral and ethical weight, which is why mothers 
and children feature so prominently in anti-deportation campaigns. 
Mary 
Despite the fact she was born in Britain, the Government was able to imprison Sonia‘s 
daughter, Mary, indefinitely from birth because under the British Nationality Act 1981 (which 
came into force on 1 January 1983) children born in Britain to non-citizen mothers are not 
entitled to British citizenship. As the UK Border Agency states on its website: 
Even if you were born in the United Kingdom, you will not be a British citizen if 
neither of your parents was a British citizen or legally settled here at the time of your 
birth. This means you are not a British citizen if, at the time of your birth, your parents 
were in the country temporarily, had stayed on without permission, or had entered 
the country illegally and had not been given permission to stay here indefinitely 
(United Kingdom Border Agency2008).  
Mary‘s birth certificate, like that of all de facto stateless children born in Britain, was 
confiscated by the immigration authorities. Had Mary been born before 1983, she would 
automatically have been granted citizenship, and as a citizen her indefinite detention as a 
British Citizen could have been legally challenged. As it stands, Mary, like thousands of 
other children born in Britain each year, is in the extraordinary position of having entered 
Britain illegally at birth. With the cut of the umbilical cord and her first breath she became 
subject to the full force of Britain‘s border controls including indefinite detention within a 
rapidly expanding, privately owned, ‗for profit‘ immigration prison estate.10  
 
Detention centres in the UK are generally screened from public view and, as one 
humanitarian report on conditions inside detention centres notes, ‗The voices of the people 
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affected by detention are seldom heard in the debate about immigration detention…. 
Detainees are forcibly physically separated from the outside world. As a result, their rage, 
bewilderment and shock at what is happening to them remains largely hidden‘ (2004, p. 12). 
If they are released, detainees are often too afraid to speak out about their experiences, 
fearing backlash and targeting from immigration authorities. Hence there are very few 
accounts of detention or representations of British detention sites in circulation. Few images 
exist of the physical structures themselves and little documentary evidence of what takes 
place within the regimes of detention is in circulation. Places of detention are literally 
enclosed by internal borders, states within states screened from view.  Paradoxically, 
however, the existence of detention centres is a matter of public fact, a fact that is routinely 
capitalised on in Governmental rhetoric as a means of demonstrating Britain‘s ‗toughness‘. 
Immigrant prisons and practices of deportation thus play a central role in materialising 
borders in the national imaginary. Thus detention centres have a visible and instrumental 
existence; they physically separate citizens and non-citizens, keeping apart those who 
deserve to be protected by the British state from the abject -- those who do not. Rushdie 
argued that the abolition of birthright citizenship in the 1981 Nationality Act was State 
Racism, the implications of which would impact on all the people of Britain, stripping away 
their most fundamental freedoms. As he wrote: 
For nine centuries any child born on British soil was British. Automatically. By right. 
Not by permission of the State. The Nationality Act abolished the ius soli. From now 
on citizenship is the gift of government. You were blind, because you believed the 
Act was aimed at the blacks; and so you sat back and did nothing as Mrs. Thatcher 
stole the birthright of every one of us, black and white, and of our children and 
grandchildren for ever. 
Since the abolition of birthright citizenship, maternity wards across Britain have become 
‗border zones‘ through which ‗aliens‘ enter Britain. Pregnant non-citizens are searched at 
airports as ‗health tourists‘, turned away from hospitals in childbirth, detained, deported. The 
bodies of non-citizens, pregnant women, mothers and children, have become one of the key 
sites through which Britain‘s national borders materialise. In migration studies, borders have 
tended to be understood as places; however, borders are also practices, and for non-citizen 
mothers the everyday activities of mothering, attending toddlers‘ groups, and the school run 
can become routines fraught with risk as they make themselves and their children visible 
and thus vulnerable to immigration control.  As Nyers argues, ‗For people without status, 
everyday activities (working, driving, and going to school) are at risk of being transformed 
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into criminal and illicit acts with dire consequences‘ (2008, p.166-167). This anxiety about 
visibility in everyday situations is not misplaced. As Liz Fekete has noted, the British Home 
Office issued Border and Immigration Officials with a manual advising on ‗the use of control 
and restraint techniques for deporting asylum seeker children, stipulating that they must 
have skills in paediatric emergency lifesaving‘. The same manual also ‗gives official sanction 
to the rounding up of children from schools to be detained with their families‘ (2005, p.75). 
For pregnant women and mothers the possibility of ‗flying below the radar‘ of the social 
apparatuses that trigger the bureaucratic machinery of detention and deportation is almost 
impossible. What Rushdie foresaw was the ways in which governance through citizenship 
would come to subject not only non-citizens but all citizens, so that all social institutions, 
prisons, factories, hospitals, universities, schools become border zones, sites of immigration 
control.  Indeed, one of the obligations of citizenship is henceforth to establish the right to 
citizenship of others.  
 
The 1981 British Nationality Act has formed the basis for some of the most discriminatory 
and dehumanising state practices to take place on British soil in the modern era. It 
designated who could be a citizen and from whom citizenship could be legally deprived. For 
example, section 40 of the Act granted powers to the Secretary of State to deprive a British 
citizen of their citizenship status if s/he ‗is satisfied that to do so is conducive to the public 
good‘ (Goldsmith 2007). Being without citizenship in a world of states is often devastating. 
As political scientist Matthew Gibney argues:   
 
In an international system where sovereign states each claimed the right to fashion 
their entry and citizenship policies according to their own national or ethnic criteria, 
refugees were outcasts. They were, in Arendt‘s words, ‗the scum of the earth‘ (2004, 
p.3)  
 
While international protections, such as the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
(1951) and the Convention on the Prevention of Stateless Persons (1954) were ostensibly 
put in place by the international community to enable non-citizens to have access to the 
protection of states, since the 1980s individual states and regional governments have 
increasingly flouted international law.  Since the mid 1990s, Britain has witnessed one of the 
largest imprisonments of foreign nationals (non-citizens) since the internment of German 
nationals during the Second World War, the deportation of hundreds of thousands of failed 
asylum seekers and other ‗illegals‘, and the enforced destitution of at least 250,000 men, 
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women and children who have failed to secure citizenship, and have no access to the 
provisions of the welfare state, but are unable or unwilling to return to their often war-torn 
countries of origin. This final, and by far the largest group, are de facto stateless; they have 
no civil or political rights, no legal right to work, no access to any social security, housing or 
health care (except in life or death situations), and they are consequently vulnerable and 
subject to exploitation (Blitz 2006).   
 
Conclusion 
At an historical juncture when the British government is instituting a programme of reforms 
aimed at ‗deepening citizenship‘ through further legislation, compulsory citizenship 
education, and new categories of ‗active‘ and ‗earned‘ citizenship (Goldsmith 2008, p.11, 
and Smith 2008), this article has made a critical intervention in debates about citizenship and 
its design. It has explored the abject underside of the democratic veneer of British 
citizenship, the gap between stated objectives of social citizenship agendas and the 
authoritarian character of much legislation, policy and practice in this area. This is not an 
original claim.  Michel Foucault (and latterly Giorgio Agamben) argued that the bestowal of 
rights and liberties to people always marks the institution of a biopolitical relation between 
the subject and the state. In this respect, citizenship has always been ‗two-faced‘, ‗the bearer 
both of subjection to sovereign power and of individual liberties‘ (Agamben, 1998, p. 125). 
Similarly, political geographer Erik Swyngedouw has used the term ‗governance innovation‘ 
to describe the ways in which the proliferation and expansion of purportedly democratic 
forms, such as citizenship, are employed as a means of controlling and in some cases 
excluding of populations deemed undesirable (2005, p. 1992). However, this article does 
make a specific historical claim, that the 1981 British Nationality Act marked a decisive break 
from a Marshallian model of liberal citizenship, founded in social justice, welfare and mutual 
obligation, to a model of citizenship, in which it is the responsibility of the individual citizen to 
earn, demonstrate or buy their ‗right‘ to state protection and care. The result is aA citizenship 
which combines the post-imperial state racism I have been describing in this essay, with a 
neoliberal ideology in which the market has become ‗an ethic in itself, capable of acting as a 
guide for all human action, and substituting for all previously existing ethical beliefs‘ (Harvey 
2005, p.3). The intersections of state racism and global markets are illustrated by the 
tremendous growth of a global immigration industry, a global multi-billion-dollar business, 
which is one arm of the massive ‗industrial corrections complex‘. Whilst it is beyond the 
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scope of this article, this argument suggests we need better accounts of the economics of 
state racism as it intersects with global corporate interests.   
In 1981, then, British citizenship was redesigned to fail specific populations.  British 
citizenship transitioned into biopolitical ‗governmentality‘,11 a vast and proliferating 
bureaucracy from which flow categories of people marginalised by, excluded or disqualified 
from citizenship and the rights which flow from this status. British citizenship now describes a 
legal, political and social field of intelligibility, a biopolitics which produces some bodies and 
groups as failing, abject or outside of the realm of citizenship altogether. This might mean 
failures at mundane and banal levels of everyday identification, such as the failure to have 
the right kind of educational aspirations or the right kind of body, or the kinds of failures I 
have described in this article--such as possession of the wrong kind of paperwork, the failure 
to produce the right kind of evidence to secure leave to remain, or being born in Britain to a 
‗failed‘ mother. The central point is that failure is an organising logic of British citizenship. 
 
Any account of British citizenship will be provisional because citizenship is continually 
recreated through complex legal, political, social and pedagogical practices. Different kinds 
of citizens emerge at the intersections of formal and informal practices of states, within 
institutions, legal and political practices, communication flows and through pedagogical 
training. Conflicting forms of citizenship materialize through local, national and transnational 
bureaucratic processes: for T.H Marshall, debate about citizenship was evidence of its 
democratic potentiality. I do not wish to devalue the diverse, rich and important history of 
citizenship in global democratic struggles, or claim that citizenship can never be a positive 
force for social change. However, we must acknowledge the other face of citizenship, the 
global business in immigrant prisons, the vast, monstrous bureaucracy from which flows 
categories of destitute peoples marginalised by, excluded or disqualified from citizenship. 
There are many hundreds of thousands of people like Sonia who are living ‗unliveable lives‘ 
at the borders of the British State, and their children born in British hospitals are de facto 
stateless aliens. As a group of hunger-striking mothers held in immigration detention with 
their children wrote in a letter to the British Government in 2008 `Even a dog is better treated 
than a child who is born in this country‘. If citizenship is increasingly designed for purposes 
of disenfranchisment and political dispossession, in what sense can it be said to retain any 
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1
 I am indebted to Weber‘s argument that citizenship designates some US citizens as 
normal, safe, and successful and others abnormal, unsafe, and temporarily failed (Weber, 
2007, forthcoming). 
2  Biopolitics is understood here as the ‗explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for 
achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations‘ (see Foucault, 1981. p. 
140).  
3 See Keith 1993. 
4 `National minorities` is a term used by Hannah Arendt to describe precarious populations 
within a nation-state who risk disenfranchishment. 
5 Whilst British citizenship has arguably existed in fragmented forms in common law since 
the mediæval period, it was predominantly a means of legal protection (for property owners) 
against crown and/or state power, enabling the wealthy to remain free from state 
interference, rather than offering rights or protections to the majority population (see Isin and 
Turner, 2007, p.6). 
6 It was Marshall‘s pivotal ‗Citizenship and Social Class‘ (1950) that placed citizenship at the 
centre of debates about the establishment of a new ‗civic bargain‘ between the individual 
and the state in Britain. In a series of essays and books written over three decade, Marshall 
laid down the principles of a social citizenship founded in equality and political solidarity 
across classes. Nevertheless, within popular culture citizenship remained an obscure and 
often derided concept associated with radical unionism or communist politics. 
 
7 Approximately a quarter of residents of Brixton are of African and/or Caribbean descent. 
Brixton is particularly associated with the ‗Windrush Generation‘ British Nationals from the 
former colonies who immigrated to Britain from the West Indies in the 1940s.   
8 ‗Sus law‘ is the informal name for the use of an 1824 law which enabled police to ‗stop and 
search‘ people on suspicion alone. This law was abolished as a consequence of the Brixton 
riots and as a recommendation of the Scarman Report (1982). However, recent terror laws 
have arguably returned the powers of 'sus law' to the police 
9 This data is taken from Channel Four, 
http://www.channel4.com/history/microsites/U/untold/programs/riot/timeline.html 
 
10 The detention of Sonia and Mary cost British taxpayers at least £2,000 a week. This was 
paid to Global Solutions Limited (GSL), the multinational company that managed Yarl‘s 
Wood during this period. GSL is an arm of multinational security company GS4, which 
describes itself as ‗the largest security services provider globally with operations in more 
than 100 countries on 6 continents‘, a turnover of £4.5 billion in 2007, and over 570,000 
employees (GS4, 2009). In July 2007, then Immigration Minister Liam Byrne delivered a 
speech to Border and Immigration Agency staff entitled ‗Border Security and Immigration: 
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Our Deal for Delivery in 2008‘, in which he promised further, massive expansion of Britain‘s 
detention estate, financed through public-private partnerships.  
 
11 I am defining governmentality, after Foucault, as a mode of governance in which power 
and authority is defused and becomes distributed through a range of social and institutional 
sites and practices within the state. 
